Brazil’s new neutrality as an opportunity for Europe
The country is currently readjusting its position in global politics. Its geopolitical neutrality could become a strategic advantage for the German economy’s most important investment location in South America.
by Alexander Busch, Latin America correspondent for Handelsblatt and Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Brazil’s diplomacy is being put to the test in the coming days. Within a month, several important meetings will take place at which the country will have to make clear what position it is seeking in world politics and thus also in the global economy.
The events are high-profile: The BRICS+ summit in Russia will kick things off – the first meeting following the expansion of the association of states. The APEC Forum (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) from November 10 to 16 in Peru is important for Brazil’s future connection to South America and the Asian market. Brazil will host the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro (November 18-19). Immediately afterwards, Chinese head of state Xi Jinping will visit Brazil to mark the 50th anniversary of Sino-Brazilian relations.
It can be assumed that Brazil will attempt to demonstrate a geopolitically neutral position on these occasions, comparable to the role of a non-aligned state. In view of the increasing intensification of global political confrontations, this is a difficult undertaking – and will disappoint many who expect Brazil to adopt a clear global political stance.
For example, the Brazilian government has lost sympathy in the USA and Europe by taking sides with Russia, Venezuela and Palestine. The “peace plan” for Ukraine presented jointly by Brazil and China, which primarily takes Russian interests into account, has further increased doubts in the democratic West.
At the same time, however, Brazil has so far resisted China’s attempts to embrace it. Beijing is urging Brazil to sign a Silk Road agreement in order to give Chinese investors better access. However, Brasília wants technology access and reliable investment commitments, which China has neither offered nor is willing to guarantee.
Brazil is also negotiating with China from a position of strength: China is Brazil’s largest trading partner. However, China is dependent on food and oil imports from Brazil precisely because of the confrontation with the USA.
The extent to which Brazil will succeed in remaining “neutral” in global politics in the future will not only be decided in Brasília, but also by political developments in Washington and Beijing over the next few years.
In Europe, however, we should also see Brazil’s striving for equidistance from the new and old power blocs as an opportunity. For three reasons:
1) Brazil’s neutrality could prove to be a positive location factor in the event of an intensification of the power struggle between new and old superpowers. Brazil will try to continue to trade with the whole world and stay in touch. European companies should take this into account when reorganizing their value chains under the heading of “nearshoring”.
2) Brazil will become more important as an exporter in the global economy: the country will gain in importance as a producer and global supplier of food, industrial raw materials and conventional and sustainable energy.
3) And last but not least: Brazil, like the economically most important countries in South America, is a democracy. There are no signs that they want to change this.
Against this backdrop, the conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement would be all the more important, as it would be a win-win situation for both sides. Both regions would significantly increase their geopolitical weight by establishing the world’s largest economic community. This should be in the interests of both South America and Europe.