The region is undergoing a historic political shift

The new conservative to right-wing populist governments are ideologically closer to the U.S. than their left-wing predecessors. At the same time, they are unlikely to want to do without Europe as a player between Washington and Beijing.

 by Alexander Busch, Latin America correspondent for Handelsblatt and NZZ

The elections in Colombia and Peru have confirmed a political trend that has been emerging for several years. In Colombia, conservative criminal defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella narrowly won the presidential runoff against his left-wing opponent.

In Peru, the election results have not yet been officially confirmed. However, there is little doubt about the outcome of the election. As things stand, Keiko Fujimori is likely to assume the presidency. The daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori has thus made it to the top of the political system on her fourth attempt.

Both candidates were successful because they pledged a tough stance against organized crime during the campaign. At the same time, they promised to roll back state influence and promote private investment.

In this regard, Fujimori and de la Espriella’s platforms resemble those of numerous successful candidates in recent years. Of the last 15 presidential elections in Latin America, twelve were won by candidates associated with the conservative or right-wing political camp.

Only in Brazil and Mexico—the region’s two largest economies—are governments to the left of the political center still in power. Uruguay and Guatemala are also in this category. But even in Brazil, a right-wing candidate could be elected in the elections four months from now.

Latin America is thus once again experiencing a profound shift in the political cycle. After the so-called “pink tide” of left-wing and left-nationalist governments had shaped the region since the early 2000s, conservative and right-wing populist forces now dominate the political landscape.

This development also reflects societal changes. For years, polls have shown a growing prevalence of conservative values in many countries across the region, particularly among younger voters. This trend has been reinforced by the growing political and social influence of evangelical churches.

The spectrum of the new governments ranges from economically liberal to strongly populist initiatives. What they have in common is skepticism toward an overreaching state and a demand for greater public safety.

Argentine President Javier Milei is primarily pursuing economic policy goals. He aims to reduce the state’s influence, cut public spending, and generate growth through investor-friendly policies.

Nayib Bukele’s priorities in El Salvador are quite different. His government is focused on restoring public safety. For many conservative politicians in the region, Bukele is now seen as a role model in the fight against crime. The autocratic president succeeded in drastically reducing his country’s homicide rate within just a few years. Today, he is the most popular head of state in Latin America.

Most of the recently elected presidents operate between these two poles—tough security policies and economic liberalism. There are comparatively moderate conservative governments, such as in Chile under José Antonio Kast, in Paraguay under Santiago Peña, or in Bolivia under Rodrigo Paz. Alongside them are more populist leaders such as Milei in Argentina, Bukele in El Salvador, the Bolsonaro family in Brazil, or de la Espriella in Colombia.

Despite these differences, their rise marks a common political shift: the region’s central issues have shifted from redistribution and social inclusion toward security, order, and economic dynamism.

This political shift is also changing relations between Latin America and Europe.

On the one hand, the new governments will seek close political ties with Washington. They hope for investment, financing, and security assistance in the fight against organized crime.

The interest is certainly mutual. Donald Trump’s new security strategy for the Western Hemisphere is based on closer cooperation with the countries of Latin America. Under the umbrella of the “Shield of the Americas,” a security and defense alliance is taking shape that is intended to consolidate U.S. influence in the region. Together, Washington and its partners aim to crack down on drug cartels and organized crime, control migration flows, and limit the influence of China and Russia.

However, unconditional alignment with the U.S. is unlikely. Trump has shown on multiple occasions that even close allies are not immune to punitive tariffs or political pressure if it serves his domestic political interests.

This is precisely where a strategic opportunity arises for Europe. The more the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China intensifies in Latin America, the more attractive a third partner could become—one that neither asserts hegemonic claims nor views the region primarily as a security buffer zone.

As an investor and a politically predictable actor, Europe could even strengthen its position in the region despite the shift in political trends.